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HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? GIVING
FIDUCIARIES AND PARTICIPANTS
ADEQUATE INFORMATION ABOUT PLAN
EXPENSES
DEBRA A. DAVIS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the fees charged to a plan is a critical
component of a fiduciary's responsibilities and important
information for participants to have. In order to help participants
save for retirement, fiduciaries of 401(k) plans need to make sure
that the plan is not paying more than reasonable fees for the
services provided. In order to accomplish this duty, fiduciaries
must understand the fees paid by the plan.
It is not always easy for fiduciaries to understand the plan's
fees. The complexity of the manner in which fees are paid by
retirement plans can make it challenging for this information to be
communicated to fiduciaries in a meaningful way. Both direct and
indirect payments by the plan can be complicated. For example,
direct payments may be determined based on a formula where the
payment is a percentage that is calculated daily based on the
plan's assets. Indirect compensation can be even more difficult to
understand. Investment companies frequently make payments to
a plan's service providers that vary based on the amount of plan
assets in each of the investment options and that typically reduce
the investment's earnings (known as "revenue sharing"). Different
investment options pay different amounts of revenue sharing. As
a result, it may be difficult for fiduciaries to understand the
amount of indirect compensation being paid as a result of the
plan's investments.
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Participants also need information about the plan's expenses.
In most 401(k) plans, participants are primarily responsible for
funding and investing their accounts' assets in order to obtain
adequate retirement income. As a result, they need adequate
information to decide whether to participate in the plan and if
they participate, information about the expenses associated with
the investment options offered by the plan.
There is little doubt that fees can have a significant impact on
the amount of money participants will have at retirement.1 The
U.S. Department of Labor (the "Department") provides the
following example in its publication on fees in 401(k) plans:
Assume that you are an employee with 35 years until retirement
and a current 401(k) account balance of $25,000. If returns on
investments in your account over the next 35 years average 7
percent and fees and expenses reduce your average returns by 0.5
percent, your account balance will grow to $227,000 at retirement,
even if there are no further contributions to your account. If fees and
expenses are 1.5 percent, however, your account balance will grow to
only $163,000. The 1 percent difference in fees and expenses would
reduce your account balance at retirement by 28 percent. 2
Thus, it is critical that the law provide fiduciaries and
participants with the information they need to make decisions
about their plans. This article addresses the types of information
needed by fiduciaries of and participants in employer-sponsored
401(k) plans in order for plans to operate efficiently and
effectively. Part I of this article highlights the issues involving fee
disclosure in 401(k) plans. Part II discusses the unique structure
of 401(k) plans. Part III addresses the roles of fiduciaries and
their responsibilities in these types of plans. Part IV analyzes the
information needed by fiduciaries to fulfill these responsibilities
and provides suggestions for improving the disclosures that are
made to them. Part V discusses the roles of participants in 401(k)
plans and Part VI evaluates the information needed by
participants to make decisions regarding the plan and suggests
ways in which this could be accomplished.
II.

STRUCTURE OF 401(K) PLANS

Plans that allow employees to elect to defer a portion of their
pay into the plan on a pre-tax basis are known as 401(k) plans.
1. See Colleen E. Medill, Challenging the Four 'Truths"of PersonalSocial
Security Accounts: Evidence from the World of 401(k) Plans, 81 N.C. L. REV.
901, 907-08, 937-46 (2003) (discussing the effect of fees on employees' account

balances at retirement).
2.

U.S. Dep't of Labor Publication, A Look At 401(k) Plan Fees, available

at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k-employee.html (last visited June
29, 2008).
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They are a type of defined contribution plan and can be sponsored
by employers or employee organizations. 3 Defined contribution,
4
and in particular 401(k) plans, have become increasingly popular.
The number of participants in defined contribution plans has
significantly increased.
The U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported that the number of active participants
covered by defined contribution plans increased from thirty-three
million in 1985 to fifty-five million in 2005.5 The GAO also
reported that ninety-five percent of all defined contributions had a
401(k) component in 2005.6
A. Responsibilityfor Funding Participants'Accounts
In defined contribution plans, a participant's benefit is
primarily based on the contributions that are made to his account
and any earnings on those contributions. 7 In 401(k) plans, a
person who participates in the plan (known as a participant) is
entitled to the amount of money in his account.8 The value of a
participant's account is based on the deferrals made by the
participant, any employer contributions, other income such as
forfeitures that are allocated to the account and the investment
earnings. 9 The value of the account is reduced by expenses. 10
Employers have the ability to make contributions to 401(k)

3. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (2000). This article focuses on plans sponsored by
employers.
4. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Susan J. Stabile & Bruce A. Wolk,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 58-62 (4th ed. 2006) (defining and

discussing various defined contribution plans); Susan J. Stabile, Is it Time to
Admit the Failureof an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 305 (2007) (scrutinizing the employer-based 401(k) system); Susan J.
Stabile, The Behavior of Defined ContributionPlan Participants,77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71, 74-75 (2002) exploring the "behavioral tendencies that affect
participant behavior in defined contribution plans"); Regina T. Jefferson,
Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 613
(2000) (discussing the movement toward defined contribution plan usage);
Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans
Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2000)
(examining the shift from the defined benefit plan toward the 401(k) plan).
5. GAO, Private Pensions: Increased Reliance on 401(k) Plans Calls for
Better Information on Fees, Testimony before the House of Representatives,
Committee on Education and Labor 5 (Mar. 5, 2007).
6. Id. at 7.
7. See generally, Stabile, supra note 4 (scrutinizing the employer-based
401(k) system); Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself Retirement: Encouraging
Employees to Direct the Investment of Their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 353 (2006) (discussing the function of a defined contribution
plan); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined ContributionParadigm,114 YALE L.J.
451 (2004) (analyzing the defined contribution trend).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B) (2000).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2000).
10. Id.
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plans, but are under no obligation to do so. Where a defined
contribution plan contains a 401(k) feature, plan sponsors are not
required to make any other contributions to the plan." Although
401(k) deferrals are withheld from participants' pay checks, they
are considered employer contributions.
B. Selecting the Investments for a Participant'sAccount
Retirement plan assets are typically invested in a number of
investments.
Under ERISA, fiduciaries are responsible for
prudently selecting and monitoring their plan's investments. 12
They are also responsible for allocating participants' accounts
among those investments. 13 As discussed in greater detail below,
the responsibility for allocating participants' accounts can be
shifted to participants who select the investments for their
accounts.1 4 Fiduciaries can also receive protection for participants
who do not make investment decisions if the fiduciaries invest
their accounts in a qualified default investment alternative and
15
make the required disclosures.
In most 401(k) plans, participants are responsible for deciding
how their accounts will be allocated among the plan's
investments.' 6 Abstracts of Form 5500 for the 2005 plan year,
which are the most recent available, reflect that approximately
eighty-nine percent of all 401(k) plans allowed participants to
direct some or all of the investment of their accounts among the
investments offered by the plan, which cover around ninety-six
percent of all active 401(k) plan participants. 17

III.

FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY

Fiduciaries who manage retirement plans must prudently
oversee the plans' investments and the use of those investments.
Guidance issued by the Department and court cases explain the
methodology fiduciaries must use in order to fulfill those
obligations.

11. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1976); 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(2) (2000).
12. See generally, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000) (providing for the "[p]rudent
man standard of care").
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1979).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2000).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5) (2000).
16. See, Zelinsky, supra note 7, at 484.
17. Private Pension Plan Bulletin Abstract of 2005, Form 5500 Annual
Reports, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Washington, D.C., Feb. 2008). The bulletin
indicated that 387,116 out of 436,207 401(k) plans allowed participants to
direct some or all of their accounts and approximately 62,732,000 out of
65,652,000 participants were able to direct some or all of their accounts.
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General Duties

Fiduciaries must comply with ERISA, which imposes strict
requirements upon them. Fiduciaries are required to act solely in
the interest of participants.18 ERISA provides that "a fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries. .. "19 They are
required to discharge their duties for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and paying only reasonable
20
expenses.
Fiduciaries are held to the standard of a knowledgeable
prudent person, known as the prudent person rule.
When
determining whether fiduciaries acted prudently, they will be
evaluated based on whether they acted "with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims... "21
Thus, fiduciaries are
compared to prudent persons who are familiar with the issue being
addressed by the fiduciaries and how they would act in similar
circumstances.
Courts have held that fiduciaries' compliance with ERISA's
requirements is evaluated based on whether they used a prudent
process, which requires both procedural and substantive prudence.
Procedural prudence involves obtaining the relevant information
needed to make a decision.
Substantive prudence requires
fiduciaries to use that information to make a reasoned decision.
The court in Riley v. Murdock explained:
Courts have articulated two way[s] in which to measure a fiduciary's
use of prudence in carrying out their duties. The first is whether
the fiduciary employed the appropriate methods to diligently
investigate the transaction and the second is whether the decision
ultimately made was reasonable based on the information resulting
22
from the investigation.
Courts have stated that a prudent process requires fiduciaries
to conduct an investigation to obtain the relevant facts when
making decisions about the plan.23 The court in Roth v. SawyerCleator Lumber Co. explained that "a fiduciary is obligated to

18.

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000). The term "participants" is used in this

document to refer to both participants and beneficiaries.
19. Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
22. Riley v. Murdock, 890 F. Supp. 444, 458 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (citation
omitted).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater N.Y.,
909 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted).
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investigate all decisions that will affect the pension plan .. *"24
Similarly, the court in Fink v. National Savings and Trust Co.
stated, "A fiduciary's independent investigation of the merits of a
particular investment is at the heart of the prudent person
25
standard."
The failure to conduct an investigation may be viewed as a
breach of a fiduciary's duties. In United States v. Mason Tenders
Dist. Council of GreaterNew York, the court stated, "The failure to
make any independent investigation and evaluation of a potential
26
plan investment is a breach of fiduciary obligations."
Fiduciaries must then use the information they obtained to
make a reasoned decision. As the court in Lanka v. O'Higgins
explained, the prudent process requirement is an:
[Olbjective standard, requiring the fiduciary (1) to employ proper
methods to investigate, evaluate and structure the investment; (2)
to act in a manner as would others who have a capacity and
familiarity with such matters; and (3) to 27exercise independent
judgment when making investment decisions.
Fiduciary responsibility is focused on the process used, rather
than the outcome obtained. The court in Laborers National
Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc.
explained, "In determining compliance with ERISA's prudent man
standard, courts objectively assess whether the fiduciary, at the
time of the transaction, utilized proper methods to investigate,
evaluate and structure the investment; acted in a manner as
would others familiar with such matters; and exercised
28
independent judgment when making investment decisions."
Thus, fiduciaries' compliance with ERISA's requirements will
be evaluated based on whether the process they used to make
decisions involved procedural and substantive prudence.
Fiduciaries must investigate an issue and request the types of
information that a prudent person who is knowledgeable about the
issue would deem important.
Fiduciaries must use the
information obtained to make a reasoned decision based on the
information that their investigation revealed.

24. Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 1994).
25. Fink v. Nat'l Savings & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
26. Mason Tenders, 909 F.Supp. at 887.
27. Lanka v. O'Higgins, 810 F. Supp. 379, 387 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations
omitted).
28. Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc.,
173 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999.) See also, Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp.
1221, 1238 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (citations and footnote omitted) (analyzing the
meaning of the prudence standard through case law).
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B. Plan Investment Duties
ERISA's requirements apply to fiduciaries' obligations with
29
respect to the selection and monitoring of the plan's investments.
In performing these duties, fiduciaries are held to the standard of
a knowledgeable prudent person. 30 In the context of the plan's
investments, fiduciaries are evaluated based on how a prudent
person who is knowledgeable about retirement plan investing
would act. The Department has issued regulations regarding the
manner in which fiduciaries should comply with the prudent
person rule in the context of plan investments. The regulation
explains:
With regard to an investment or investment course of action taken
by a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan pursuant to his
investment duties, the requirements of section 404(a)(1)(B) ... are
satisfied if the fiduciary (i) has given appropriate consideration to
those facts and circumstances that, given the scope of such

fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know
are relevant to the particular investment or the investment course of
action involved, including the role the investment or the investment
course of action plays in that portion of the plan's investment

portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties;
and (ii) [h]as acted accordingly.31

Thus, fiduciaries must determine which facts and
circumstances are relevant to making prudent investment
decisions, must gather the needed information, evaluate it, and
reach a reasoned and informed decision. In evaluating whether a
fiduciary has satisfied ERISA's requirements, courts look at
whether the fiduciary engaged in a prudent process when making
decisions. As discussed above, engaging in a prudent process
involves both substantive and procedural prudence.
That is,
fiduciaries should determine what information is material and
relevant to their task, examine and understand that information,
and then make an informed and reasoned decision based on that
32
information.
1. Investment Decisions Necessitate Knowledge of Investment
Concepts
In making their investment decisions, the Department and
courts have held that fiduciaries should consider generally

29.
30.
31.
32.

29 C.F.R.
29 U.S.C.
29 C.F.R.
See, e.g.,

§ 2550.404a-1 (1979).
§ 1104(a)(1) (2000).
§ 2550.404a-l(a)(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
29 C.F.R. 2550.404a-l(b) (1979) (providing for investment

duties of the fiduciary).

1012

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:1005

accepted investment theories. "Generally accepted investment
theories" refers to the fundamental and broadly acknowledged
principles underlying modern concepts of investing. These include
concepts such as modern portfolio theory and should be used by
fiduciaries when selecting the categories of investment to offer in
the plan.
Modern portfolio theory provides that a portfolio should be
made up of a variety of investment categories that perform
differently from one another. For example, equities, bonds and
cash are examples of three distinct asset classes. The concept is
that risk and reward can be balanced through the selection of
different types of investments.
The Department's regulation to ERISA section 404(a)
describes the manner in which a fiduciary will satisfy his
investment duties. Although the regulation does not use the term
"modern portfolio theory," the methodology it describes is
consistent with modern portfolio theory. The regulation indicates
that the fiduciary will satisfy his duties under ERISA if he "[h]as
given appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances
that, given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the
fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the particular
investment or investment course of action involved ...and [h]as
acted accordingly." 3 The regulation explains that a fiduciary may
be considered to have given "appropriate consideration" to relevant
facts and circumstances if he determines that "the particular
investment.., is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio...
to further the purposes of the plan, taking into consideration the
risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return)
associated with the investment or investment course of
action. . . ."34 The fiduciary should also consider "[t]he composition
of the portfolio with regard to diversification; ... [t]he liquidity
and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash
flow requirements of the plan; and... [t]he projected return of the
35
portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan."
In Laborers National, the court explained that the language
used in the regulation supports the use of modern portfolio theory.
The court stated, "In general, the regulations provide that the
fiduciary shall be required to act as a prudent investment
manager under the modern portfolio theory rather than under the
common law of trusts standard. .".."36 The court stated, "Since
1979, [fiduciaries] have been held to the standard of prudence of
the modern portfolio theory by the Secretary's regulations. '37
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(a)-1 (1979).
Id.
Id.
Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund, 173 F.3d at 317.
Id. at 322.

2008]

Giving Fiduciariesand ParticipantsAdequate Information

1013

Similarly, the court in Chao v. Moore interpreted the regulation in
the same manner. The court stated, "In interpreting the duty of
prudence, the Secretary [of Labor] has prescribed regulations that
38
incorporate modern portfolio theory."
Guidance issued by the Department indicates that fiduciaries
should use generally accepted investment theories, such as
modern portfolio theory. The Department indicated in guidance
that "[s]everal commentators requested classification of the
requirement that asset allocation models and interactive
investment materials must be based on 'generally accepted
investment theories' . . . .39
The Department stated that it
"included this requirement to assure that, for purposes of the safe
harbors, any models or materials presented to participants or
beneficiaries will be consistent with widely accepted principles of
modern portfolio theory ..."40 The use of modern portfolio theory
to support the prudence of a fiduciary's action is also demonstrated
by additional guidance issued by the Department in the form of an
41
interpretive bulletin, advisory opinion and proposed exemptions.
Thus, fiduciaries need to include in their plans investments
that are consistent with the concepts of modern portfolio theory.
As a result, the plan must offer investments with sufficient
diversity that they behave differently depending on market
conditions. As discussed below, fiduciaries need to consider a
variety of factors, including fees, when selecting these
investments.
2. ERISA Requires the Prudent Selection of Investments
After selecting the investment categories, fiduciaries need to
populate those categories using a prudent process. 42 That is,
fiduciaries must use substantive prudence to conduct an
investigation to gather the information that a person
knowledgeable about investments would consider important under
similar circumstances. For example, fiduciaries may want to
obtain information about the investments' historical performance
over various time periods as well as benchmarking information for
their peer groups.
Fiduciaries must also consider the investments' associated
expenses. The GAO reported that "Various fees are associated
with 401(k) plans, but investment and record-keeping fees account

38. Chao v. Moore, No. Civ.A. AW-99-1283, 2001 WL 743204, at *4 (D. Md.
June 15, 2001).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1996).

40. Id.
41. Id.; U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Opinion 2001-09A; U.S. Dep't of Labor
Application for IPTE D-10897; U.S. Dep't of Labor Application for IPTE D10720; U.S. Dep't of Labor Application for IPTE D-10319.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(a)-1 (1979).
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for most 401(k) plan fees."43 Fiduciaries may be able to decrease
the plan's costs by selecting a different share class for the mutual
funds in the plan. 4 4 However, fees should not be evaluated to the
exclusion of other factors. For example, an investment may have
relatively high expenses, but have a very high historical rate of
return that fiduciaries may determine outweighs the high cost of
the investment. The Department reminds readers in its
publication on 401(k) plan fees, "Keep in mind that the law
requires the fees charged to a 401(k) plan be "'reasonable"' rather
than setting a specific level of fees that are permissible. Therefore,
45
the reasonableness of fees must be determined in each case."
Consequently, fiduciaries need to understand the fees
associated with the investment options available to their plans in
order to prudently select the plan's investments. As discussed
below, the assessment of these fees are frequently based on
formulas and can be difficult to understand.
3.

ERISA Requires the Monitoringof Investments

In addition to using a prudent process to select the plan's
investments, fiduciaries must also regularly monitor the selected
investments in order to determine whether they continue to be
appropriate for the plan.
As one court explained, "ERISA
fiduciaries must monitor investments with reasonable diligence
46
and dispose of investments which are improper to keep."
Another court explained that "[o]nce an investment has been
made, a fiduciary has an ongoing duty to monitor investments
with reasonable diligence and remove plan assets from an
47
investment that is improper."
Similarly, the Department has applied the on-going duty to
monitor to the appointment and retention of service providers.
Although the guidance focused on participant investment
education, the general principles apply to all service providers,
including providers of investment options.
The Department
explained:
[A]ny designation of a service provider to a plan... is an exercise of
discretionary authority or control with respect to management of the
plan; therefore, persons making the designation must act prudently

43.
44.

GAO, supra note 5, at 11.
Fred Reish, How You Are Paying What You Don't Know: A Primer on

Indirect Mutual Fund Payments, REISH LUFTMAN REICHER & COHEN
BULLETIN (February 2008), available at http://www.reish.com/publications

/article-detail.cfm?ARTICLEID=741.
45. U.S. Dep't of Labor Publication, A Look At 401(k) Plan Fees, available

at http://www.dol.gov/ ebsa/publicationsl401kemployee.html.
46. Whitfield v. Cohen, 682 F.Supp. 188, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
47. Harley v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 F.Supp.2d 898, 906 (D.Minn.
1999).
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and solely in the interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries,
both in making the designation(s) and in continuing such
48
designation(s).
Thus, fiduciaries must investigate and evaluate the
investments on an ongoing basis and then decide, based on the
information obtained, whether to retain or replace those
investment choices. The fees associated with the investments
should be included as part of this process.
C. FiduciaryResponsibilitiesRelated to Plan Expenses
When determining what expenses can be charged to the plan,
fiduciaries must consider the provisions of the plan document, the
type of expense involved, and whether the expense would cause
the plan to engage in a prohibited transaction.
1. Payment of ProperExpenses
Under ERISA, only reasonable expenses can be paid. ERISA
requires fiduciaries to discharge their duties for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to participants and paying only
49
reasonable expenses.
Plans may only pay for certain types of expenses. The
expenses must be attributable to fiduciary, rather than employer,
activities.
Fiduciary expenses include those related to the
administration of the plan or the implementation of decisions
made by the employer with respect to the plan. 50 Expenses related
to the employer's actions are known as "settlor" expenses and may
not be paid by the plan. Settlor expenses include costs related to
the establishment, design and termination of the plan as well as
items that exclusively benefit the employer, such as services
performed for reporting in their financial statements or FASB
Statements. 51 (Special rules apply with respect to settlor expenses
for multi-employer plans.)
Additionally, expenses can only be paid if the plan document
permits them to be paid by the plan or is silent. ERISA provides
that fiduciaries must follow the terms of the plan unless they
conflict with ERISA.52 Proper expenses may be paid using plan
assets as long as the plan document does not prohibit it. 53 That is,
if the plan document authorizes the payment of expenses from
plan assets or is silent, reasonable expenses can be paid by the

48. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(e) (1996).
49. 29 U.S.C § 1104(a)(1)(A).
50. U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Opinions 97-03A and 2001-01A.
51. U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Opinion 2001-01A and related
hypothetical examples published by the Department on January 18, 2001.
52. 29 U.S.C § 1104(a)(1)(C).
53. U.S. Dep't of Labor Advisory Opinion 2001-01A.
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plan. However, plan assets may not be used if the plan states that
the employer is responsible for expenses. That said, most plan
documents provide that plan expenses may be paid either by the
employer or from plan assets. For plans that do not permit the
payment of expenses from plan assets, the plan sponsor may
amend the plan document to allow such payments for future
expenses.
2. Avoidance of ProhibitedTransactions
54
to
ERISA prohibits a fiduciary from allowing a person
55
The
provide services to a plan unless an exemption applies.
exemption under ERISA section 408(b)(2) is commonly used, which
exempts a contract or arrangement for the provision of services if:
(i) the services are necessary for the establishment or operation of
the plan; (ii) they are provided under a reasonable contract or
arrangement; and (iii) no more than reasonable compensation is
paid for the services.5 6 Similar provisions are contained in the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). 57 Although provisions regarding
prohibited transactions are contained in both ERISA and the
Code, the Department has the sole authority to issue guidance
with respect to most types of prohibited transactions under both
58
ERISA and the Code.

54. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) defines the term "person" as "an individual,
partnership, joint venture, corporation, mutual company, joint-stock company,
trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or employee
organization."
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2).
57. Code section 4975(c)(1)(C) prohibits a person from providing services to
a plan unless an exemption applies. Code section 4975(d)(2) contains an
exemption with the same conditions as ERISA section 408(b)(2). Treasury
Regulation § 54.4975-6 interprets Code section 4975(d)(2) and contains
26 U.S.C.
provisions similar to Department Regulation § 2550.408b-2.
§ 4975(c)(2), (d)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 54.4975-6 (1977).
58. The Treasury Department initially had authority to issue exemptions
from the Code's prohibited transaction rules. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c)(2). However,
the Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978 shifted most of the Treasury
Department's responsibilities with respect to prohibited transactions to the
It gives the Department the authority for prohibited
Department.
transactions, except with respect to excise taxes, certain IRA rules, loans to
leveraged ESOPs, certain definitions, enforcement purposes and transactions
that are exempted by ERISA section 404(c). Jimmy Carter, Reorganization
Plan No. 4 of 1978, Section 102 (Aug. 1978), available at
http:/Ibenefitsattorney.com/modules.php?name=Authorities&pa=showpage&pi
p=7. The Internal Revenue Service reiterates this delegation in
Announcement 79-6 and directs requests for guidance to the Department.
Although the Department has the authority to issue regulations and grant
exemptions, the IRS has sole responsibility for assessing excise taxes on
prohibited transactions.
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The Department has issued a regulation that interprets
ERISA's requirements. 59 It indicates that a service is necessary
for the establishment or operation of a plan if it is appropriate and
helpful to the plan in carrying out the purposes for which the plan
is established or maintained. Additionally, the service must be
furnished under a contract or arrangement that is reasonable.
The contract or arrangement must permit the plan to terminate
the contract or arrangement without penalty and on reasonably
short notice under the circumstances. Finally, it indicates that no
more than reasonable compensation may be paid for the service.
The law contains significant consequences for the plan's
primary fiduciaries as well as service providers who engage in
prohibited transactions.
The Code imposes excises taxes on
persons who engage in prohibited transactions that involve
qualified plans. The Code imposes two layers of excises taxes: (1)
an excise tax of fifteen percent for each year involved; and (2) an
excise tax of one-hundred percent if the transaction is not
60
corrected.
Additionally, ERISA permits the Department to assess civil
penalties against persons who engage in prohibited transactions.
ERISA states that in the event of "any knowing participation in [a
59. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 (1977).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(a), (b). Code section 4975(a) imposes an initial tax of
15% of the amount involved on persons who participate in prohibited
transactions. The fifteen percent excise tax is calculated based on the
"amount involved." Code section 4975(f)(4) defines the "amount involved" as
the greater of: (1) the amount of money and the fair market value of the other
property given; or (2) the amount of money and the fair market value of the
other property received. If a service provider satisfied the exemption under
Code section 4975(d)(2) or (10), other than with respect to the amount
involved, the "amount involved" is the excess compensation. The fifteen
percent excise tax is assessed on any disqualified person who participates in a
prohibited transaction. Code section 4975(e)(2) includes fiduciaries and
service providers to the plan in the definition of a "disqualified person." The
tax under Code section 4975(a) applies to every year in the taxable period
beginning on the date the prohibited transaction occurs and ending on the
earlier of the date: (i) the IRS mails a notice of deficiency for the tax, (ii) the
tax is assessed; or (iii) the prohibited transaction is corrected.
Code section 4975(b) provides that the IRS may impose an additional tax of
100% of the amount involved if the prohibited transaction is not corrected
within the taxable period. For purposes of the 100% tax, the amount involved
is based on the highest fair market value during the taxable period. Code
§ 4975(f)(4). The 100% tax under Code section 4975(b) only applies for one
year. Internal Revenue Manual, Section 4.71.5.9.1 [Last Revised: 03-01-2005].
Code section 4975(0(5) defines "correction" of a prohibited transaction as
"undoing the transaction to the extent possible, but in any case placing the
plan in a financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the
disqualified person were acting under the highest fiduciary standards." The
IRS has indicated that the correction method for the overpayment of excessive
compensation only requires that the excess contribution be reimbursed to the
plan.
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fiduciary] breach or violation by any other person, the Secretary
shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or other person
in an amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery
amount."61 The U.S. Supreme Court in Harris Trust and Savings
Bank v. Salomon Brothers, Inc. indicated that the phrase "other
person" in ERISA section 502(1) includes non-fiduciary service
providers. 62 That is, a service provider may be either a fiduciary
or a non-fiduciary with respect to a plan. Under ERISA, the term
"fiduciary" includes both a plan's primary fiduciaries who are
responsible for the operation of the plan as well as persons whose
actions make them "functional fiduciaries." Functional fiduciaries
are only responsible for the plan to the extent their actions make
them fiduciaries. ERISA defines this type of fiduciary as:
[A] person ...to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or
other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to
or discretionary
do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority
63
responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Any penalty assessed under this provision of ERISA is based
on the amount of any settlement with the Department or ordered
by a court. 64 The penalty under ERISA is offset to the extent the
person has excise taxes imposed under Code section 4975.65 The
66
Department can file a lawsuit to collect the penalty if necessary.
ERISA also allows participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries and
the Department to sue both fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries,
including service providers, who participate in a prohibited
transaction. 67 ERISA provides that fiduciaries may be sued for
breaches of any of their responsibilities under ERISA and will be
personally liable for any losses to the plan resulting from their
breach and any other appropriate equitable or remedial relief.68 A
non-fiduciary service provider may only be sued under ERISA "(A)
to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this title or the terms of the plan .. ,"69 These

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)(2).
530 U.S. 238 (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
29 U.S.C. § 11320)(2).
29 U.S.C. § 1132Q)(4).
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(6).
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), 1132(a)(2).
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3), (5).
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provisions do not address who can be sued. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon
Brothers, Inc. clarified that the language contained in these
providers. 70
service
non-fiduciary
to
applies
provisions
Consequently, a non-fiduciary service provider may be sued by
participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Department under
ERISA if the service provider knowingly participates in a
prohibited transaction.
While the Court clearly stated that service providers may be
sued for engaging in a prohibited transaction, the persons bringing
the lawsuit may only prevent an act or practice that violates
ERISA or obtain "equitable relief' for the plan. The Supreme
Court in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson held that
the term "equitable relief' means something other than monetary
damages. 71 The court explained that monetary relief is not
equitable relief.
Thus, the law contains numerous provisions to discourage
fiduciaries from allowing their plans to engage in prohibited
transactions. Service providers are dissuaded from participating
in prohibited transactions as a result of these rules as well.
3.

Common Types of Fees in 401(k) Plans

Fees for 401(k) plans can generally be described as plan
administration fees, investment charges, transactional fees (or
individual service fees). 72 As the Department explains in its
publication on fees in 401(k) plans, plan administration fees are
for the "day-to-day operation of a 401(k) plan [which] involves
expenses for basic administrative services-such as plan record
keeping, accounting, legal and trustee services-that are
necessary for administering the plan as a whole." 73 Examples of
the types of services for which these fees are paid include
"telephone voice response systems, access to a customer service
representative, educational
seminars, retirement planning
software, investment advice, electronic access to plan information,
74
daily valuation and on-line transactions."

70. 530 U.S. at 241. See also, Keach v. U.S. Trust Co., 254 F.Supp.2d 1055,
1057 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (citing Harris Trust v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530
U.S. 238 (2000)).
71. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
72. U.S. Dep't of Labor Publication, A Look At 401(k) Plan Fees, available
at http://www.dol.gov/ ebsalpublications/40 1k_employee.html.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Investment fees are assessed based on the investments held
by the plan. The Department explains that the expenses for
managing the plan's investments are "[b]y far the largest
component of 401(k) plan fees."75 These fees are typically paid as
an indirect charge. That is, they reduce the earnings for the
investment rather than being deducted directly from the
participants' accounts. The Department states "[if]or this reason,
these fees, which are not specifically identified on statements of
investments, may not be immediately apparent." 76
The plan's service providers often receive a portion of the
investment fees, which is referred to as indirect compensation
because it is paid to the service provider by a person other than
the plan or plan sponsor. The service provider may not calculate
the exact amount that is attributable to each plan they provide
services to. The reason is that this information is not readily
available, Participants' investments are typically aggregated for
indirect compensation purposes both within a plan and among
numerous plans. For example, a mutual fund would pay revenue
sharing based on the total amount of shares held at the service
provider, which would be based on the holdings of all of the
participants in all of the plans which use the service provider. The
amount received per participant is usually very small, but in the
aggregate can amount to a significant amount of money. However,
the calculations that would be required to determine the portion of
the indirect compensation per plan and then per participant would
arguably be labor-intensive. Additionally, some service providers
find that there is considerable expense involved in merely
calculating the amount of indirect compensation they are entitled
to and making sure that they receive it. As a result, most service
providers who receive indirect compensation give fiduciaries
information about it as a formula rather than as a dollar amount.
Investment fees can also be difficult for fiduciaries to
understand and compare among service providers. Different
service providers use varying methods to categorize and calculate
their fees and a service provider may charge multiple fees for its
services. Formulas are frequently used based on participants'
accounts balances at certain times during the year. Additionally,
the terminology used to describe the types of fees charges is not
always consistent among providers. Furthermore, different
providers perform different services for plans. Some providers
bundle many of the services that plans need and present them to
fiduciaries as a package, while others bundle only a few of these
services and some are completely independent (that is,
unbundled).

75. Id.
76. Id.
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Transactional fees are fees which are based on specific choices
made by participants. The Department calls them "individual
service fees" and explains that they are "charged separately to the
accounts of individuals who choose to take advantage of a
particular plan feature. For example, individual service fees may
be charged to a participant for taking a loan from the plan or for
77
executing participant investment directions."
Given the complexity involved with the fee structure of 401(k)
plans, it is understandable that inexperienced fiduciaries may not
readily comprehend the fees being paid by their plans. However,
under ERISA they are obligated to do so in order to understand
whether no more than reasonable compensation is being paid for
the services received by the plan and to prudently select and
monitor their plan's investments.
IV. FEE INFORMATION NEEDED BY FIDUCIARIES

In order to evaluate their plan's service providers and
investments, fiduciaries need to engage in a prudent process.
First, fiduciaries need to engage in procedural prudence to obtain
the necessary information about the fees being assessed and what
is being received for those fees. They then need to engage in
substantive prudence to make a decision based on that
information.
A. Information Needed for a Prudent Process
Under ERISA, fiduciaries are responsible for making
decisions about their plan's service providers and investments. As
a result, they need to identify all of the services needed by the plan
and potential service providers who can perform those services.
The types of information needed by fiduciaries in order to
engage in a prudent process in not clearly specified by ERISA.
However, fiduciaries need to be able to obtain sufficient
information about the fees charged by the plan's service providers
and their competitors in order to evaluate the fees paid by the
plan, or for a new plan, the fees charged by the service providers
that they are considering for the plan.
In order to determine whether the fees paid by the plan are
reasonable, fiduciaries need to understand the compensation paid
to their service providers as a result of the services being provided
to the plan. Thus, fiduciaries of 401(k) plans need to be able to
identify all amounts that reduce the value of participants'
accounts directly or indirectly. That is, fiduciaries need to know
what amounts are being paid directly from the plan as well as
those that reduce the plan's earnings. Additionally, they need to

77. Id.
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understand whether their service providers are entitled to and/or
are receiving any payments from third parties. Fiduciaries need
this information to evaluate the total compensation received or
eligible to be received by their service providers for the services
provided.
For example, fiduciaries may determine that the
compensation paid by a third party to their service provider, which
is calculated as a percentage of assets, is no longer appropriate
after the plan's assets have significantly increased in size. The
fiduciaries may decide to use a share class that pays that service
provider less revenue sharing after determining that the total
compensation received by the service provider is no longer
reasonable.
Furthermore, fiduciaries need to be able to compare the fees
charged by the plan's service providers to its competitors. They
need to be able to evaluate their plan's fees based on market rates
for comparable services. This can be difficult for fiduciaries
because service providers may charge a variety of fees which may
be calculated using formulas and the manner in which fees are
structured can vary significantly.
B. Current DisclosureRequirements
Current disclosure requirements vary based on whether a
plan is categorized as a large or small plan. Small plans are
generally plans that cover less than one-hundred participants.
Abstracts of Form 5500s for the 2005 plan year, which are the
most recent available, reflect that approximately eighty-six
percent of all 401(k) plans are small plans, which cover around
fourteen percent of all 401(k) participants.7 8
A large plan is a plan that covers one hundred or more
participants.7 9 Abstracts of Form 5500s for the 2005 plan year
reflect that approximately fourteen percent of all 401(k) plans are
large plans, which cover around eighty-six percent of all 401(k)
80
participants.
1. Disclosures to Small Plans
ERISA does not explicitly require service providers to make
disclosures to fiduciaries of small plans regarding the
compensation they receive in relation to the services they provide
78. Private Pension Plan Bulletin Abstract of 2005 Form 5500 Annual
Reports, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Washington, D.C. Feb. 2008), available at

http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2005pensionplanbulletin.PDF.
79. The eighty to one-hundred-twenty participant rule applies for this
purpose. That is, if the number of participants in the plan is between eighty
and one-hundred-twenty, and a Form 5500 was filed for the prior plan year,
the plan sponsor may elect to use the same category (that is, "large plan" or
"small plan") that was used for the prior year's Form 5500 filing.
80. See Private Pension Plan Bulletin, supra note 78.
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to the plans. Fiduciaries are required to pay only reasonable
expenses, however, ERISA does not contain a provision that
specifically mandates that service providers disclose their
compensation.81 Service providers are prohibited from charging
more than reasonable compensation for the services provided to
plans under the prohibited transaction rules. However, under the
current guidance, service providers to small plans are not
obligated to disclose the amount of compensation that they receive.
That said, the Department has proposed revisions to the
regulation to ERISA section 408(b)(2) that would condition the
exemption on additional disclosures being made to plans of all
sizes.
2. Disclosuresto Large Plans
ERISA also does not mandate that service providers currently
disclose their compensation to fiduciaries of large plans. However,
the Department, Internal Revenue Service and Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation have issued revisions to the Form 5500
Annual Return/Report for 2009 plan year (the "2009 Form 5500"),
which would report service providers on Schedule C who receive
compensation of at least five-thousand dollars during the plan
year.8 2 As discussed below, service providers are not currently
required to make the disclosures necessary to complete the 2009
Form 5500. However, service providers may be reported on the
2009 Form 5500 if they do not disclose the information needed to
complete the 2009 Form 5500. The Department's proposed
revisions to the regulation under ERISA section 408(b)(2) would
also condition the exemption on the provision of information
needed for reporting and disclosure purposes, including the 2009
Form 5500.
Schedule C to the 2009 Form 5500 generally requires a
sponsor of a large plan to report information regarding the direct
and indirect payments received by service providers. Service
providers are reported on Schedule C if they: (1) provided services
to or had transactions with the plan during the plan year; and (2)
received at least five-thousand dollars in reportable compensation
in connection with the services provided to the plan or their
position with the plan. Exceptions apply for certain employees of
the plan, plan sponsor, and service providers, and persons whose
only compensation consists of insurance fees and commissions
which are reported on Schedule A.

81. ERISA section 404(a) requires fiduciaries to discharge their duties for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and paying reasonable expenses of
the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
82. For convenience, I refer to these agencies collectively in this article by
reference to the Department.
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The 2009 Form 5500 uses a broad definition of compensation
that is reportable on Schedule C.
Reportable compensation
includes:
money and any other thing of value (for example, gifts, awards,
trips) received by a person, directly or indirectly, from the plan
(including fees charged as a percentage of assets and deducted from
investment returns) in connection with services rendered to the
83
plan, or the person's position with the plan.
Compensation is reported differently, depending on whether
it is direct, eligible indirect or other indirect compensation. Direct
compensation is defined as "[p]ayments made directly by the plan
for services rendered to the plan or because of a person's position
with the plan are reportable as direct compensation."8 4 The 2009
Form 5500 includes as examples: "direct payments by the plan out
of a plan account, charges to plan forfeiture accounts and fee
recapture accounts, charges to a plan's trust account before
allocations are made to individual participant accounts, and direct
8' 5
charges to plan participant individual accounts.
Indirect compensation is generally defined as amounts
received by a service provider from persons other than the plan or
the plan sponsor.8 6 In order to be "eligible" indirect compensation,
the indirect compensation must satisfy both (i) the definition of
eligible indirect compensation and (ii) a written disclosure
requirement. Eligible indirect compensation is defined as:
[Flees or expense reimbursement payments charged to investment
funds and reflected in the value of the investment or return on
investment of the participating plan or its participants[,] finders'
fees[,] "soft dollar" revenue, float revenue, and/or brokerage
commissions or other transaction-based fees for transactions or
services involving the plan that were not paid directly by the plan or
plan sponsor (whether or not they are capitalized as investment
87
costs).
The following written disclosures must be made to fiduciaries
for compensation to be considered eligible indirect compensation:
(a) the existence of the indirect compensation;
(b) the services provided for the indirect compensation or the
purpose for payment of the indirect compensation;
(c) the amount (or estimate) of the compensation or a description of
the formula used to calculate or determine the compensation; and

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

72 Fed. Reg. 64824-25.
Schedule C, line 2(a)(e).
72 Fed. Reg. 64825.
72 Fed. Reg. 64825.
72 Fed. Reg. 64826.
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(d) the identity of the party or parties paying and receiving the
88
compensation.
Other indirect compensation is any indirect compensation
that does not satisfy the definition of eligible indirect
compensation. Information similar to the disclosures that are
made to fiduciaries for eligible indirect compensation will be
reported on Schedule C to the 2009 Form 5500.
Schedule C includes a section for plan sponsors to report
service providers who fail to report information necessary to
complete Schedule C. However, the fiduciaries indicate that plan
sponsors "should contact the fiduciary or service provider to
request the necessary information and tell them you will list them
on the Schedule C ...
89

if they do not provide the necessary

information."
The Department has proposed revisions to the regulation to
ERISA section 408(b)(2) that would require service providers to
disclose the information needed for the Form 5500 in order for
service providers to rely on the exemption. As a result, fiduciaries
will be able to obtain this information if the final version of the
regulation continues to include this requirement.
C. Additional DisclosuresProposed by the Department
The Department recently issued a proposed regulation under
ERISA section 408(b)(2) that would generally require certain types
of service providers to disclose the types of services that they will
provide to plans, their compensation for those services and
potential conflicts of interest. 90 These written disclosures would be
required before a service provider entered into, extended or
renewed an arrangement with a plan.
The additional conditions in the proposed regulation would
apply to a person who is:
(A) A service provider who provides or may provide any services to
the plan pursuant to the contract or arrangement as a fiduciary
either within the meaning of section 3(21) of [ERISA] or under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940;
(B) A service provider who provides or may provide any one or more
of the following services to the plan pursuant to the contract or
arrangement: banking, consulting, custodial, insurance, investment
advisory (plan or participants), investment management,
recordkeeping, securities or other investment brokerage, or third
party administration.

. .[or]

(C) A service provider who receives or may receive indirect
compensation or fees... in connection with providing any one or
88. 72 Fed. Reg. 64826.
89. 72 Fed. Reg. 64827.
90.

72 Fed. Reg. 64740 (Nov. 16, 2007).
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more of the following services to the plan pursuant to the contract or
arrangement: accounting, actuarial, appraisal, auditing, legal, or
valuation .... 91

These service providers would need to disclose all services to
be provided to the plan under the contract and for each service, the
compensation to be received by the service provider.
Compensation is defined broadly for this purpose and includes:
[M]oney or any other thing of monetary value (for example, gifts,
awards, and trips) received, or to be received, directly from the plan
or plan sponsor or indirectly (i.e., from any source other than the
plan, the plan sponsor, or the service provider) by the service
provider or its affiliate in connection with the services to be provided
pursuant to the contract or arrangement or because of the service
92
provider's or affiliate's position with the plan.
Service providers would also need to describe their manner of
receipt of the compensation. That is, whether the service provider
will bill the plan, deduct fees directly from plan accounts, reflect a
charge against plan investments, or receive indirect payments
from a third party. The service provider would also need to
describe how any prepaid amounts will be calculated and refunded
when a contract terminates.
The proposed regulation would not require the disclosures to
be made using any particular format. Compensation could be
expressed in terms of a monetary amount, formula, percentage of
the plan's assets, or per capita charge for each participant or
beneficiary of the plan. 93 However, the manner in which
compensation would be expressed would need to include sufficient
information to enable the responsible plan fiduciary to evaluate
the reasonableness of the compensation.
According to the
preamble, the disclosures could be made in separate documents
and incorporated by reference, such as in a prospectus or Form
ADV. The preamble indicates, however, that if documents are
incorporated by reference, the service provider must indicate
where in the referenced document the information may be found.
The proposed regulation does not specify a minimum time
period for providing the disclosures as long as they would be
provided before the contract is entered into, extended or renewed.
However, the Department comments in the preamble that the

91. Id.
92. 72 Fed. Reg. 71004.
93. The preamble states that these options are available only "if a service
provider cannot disclose compensation or fees in terms of a specific monetary
amount .. " 72 Fed. Reg. 70990. However, this limitation was not included in
the proposed regulation.
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responsible plan fiduciary should make sure he obtains the
information "sufficiently in advance of entering into the
contract... to allow the fiduciary to prudently consider the
94
information."
The proposed regulation includes special provisions with
respect to a bundle of services that are priced as a package. The
bundle of services can be provided: (i) entirely by one service
provider; or (ii) by a service provider and an affiliate or
subcontractor or other party. For a bundle of services, all services
and the total direct and indirect compensation to be received by
the service provider as well as any affiliate, subcontractor or any
other party in connection with the bundle of services would need to
A bundled service provider would
be disclosed in writing.
generally not have to disclose the allocation of the compensation
among its affiliates, subcontractors, or other parties. However, an
exception would apply for direct separate charges against a plan's
investment that are reflected in the net value of the investment
and separate charges that are set on a transaction basis, such as
finder's fees, brokerage commissions, or soft dollars.
A service provider would also need to disclose in writing
whether he or an affiliate would be able to affect his own
compensation in connection with the provision of services without
The
the prior approval of an independent plan fiduciary.
Department provides "incentive, performance-based, float, or other
contingent compensation" as examples.
The proposed regulation would require the written disclosure
of whether the service provider or an affiliate has any policies or
procedures that address or prevent actual or potential conflicts of
interest or an adverse effect on the provision of services. The
preamble explains, "[f]or example, a fiduciary service provider may
have procedures for offsetting fees received from third parties
payment
or other indirect
sharing
(through revenue
arrangements) against the amount that it otherwise would charge
'95
a plan client.
The proposed regulation would require a service provider to
disclose "all information related to the contract and any
compensation received thereunder" if it is requested by the
responsible plan fiduciary or plan administrator in order to comply
with ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements. This would
arise most frequently in the context of reporting information on
Schedule C to the Form 5500 for large plans.

94.
95.

Id.
Id.

1028

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:1005

Additional disclosure items would apply, including whether
the service provider is a fiduciary, whether the service provider
has any interest in transactions involving the plan, whether a
service provider or an affiliate has any material relationships with
another service provider and the disclosure of material changes.
D. Suggested Improvements
The proposed regulation and, for large plans, the 2009 Form
5500 would provide much of the information needed by fiduciaries
in order to engage in a prudent process with respect to their plans'
service providers. However, there are the following limitations
inherent in the proposed regulation which should be remedied.
The information to be provided to fiduciaries, assuming the
final version of the proposed regulation contains substantially
similar provisions, does not have to be provided in a manner that a
reasonable person could understand. That is, service providers
have the ability to make disclosures in a way that the average
fiduciary would not be able to fully comprehend. Even if the
disclosures were made in plain English, the common use of
formulas and the varying methods for calculating fees will make it
difficult, if not impossible, for many fiduciaries to understand and
compare the fees being charged by various service providers.
As a result, a uniform method of disclosure should be required
in order to minimize this problem. While a uniform disclosure
requirement is unlikely to completely alleviate this issue given the
inherent complexity in the manner in which fees are charged in
the industry, it would provide considerable assistance to
fiduciaries (and the service providers they hire to help them
96
understand the fees paid by the plan).
V. ROLES OF PARTICIPANTS IN 401(K) PLANS
As a result of the protections afforded by ERISA, many
fiduciaries shift responsibility for allocating the plan's investments
to participants. Abstracts of Form 5500s for the 2005 plan year
indicate that approximately eighty-nine percent of all 401(k) plans
allowed participants to direct some or all of the investment of their
accounts among the investments offered by the plan, which cover
around ninety-six percent of all active 401(k) plan participants. 97
96. The American Society of Pension Professionals and Actuaries (ASPPA)
has posted a sample fee disclosure form on its web site, which I was involved
in drafting. Although other approaches could certainly be adopted, the
disclosure form drafted by ASPPA demonstrates that this type of form is
possible. The form is available at http://www.asppa.org/pdffiles/Participant.

Disclosure.Form.FIN.pdf.
97. Private Pension Plan Bulletin Abstract of 2005, Form 5500 Annual
Reports, U.S. Dep't of Labor (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2008) available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2005pensionplanbulletin.PDF.
The
bulletin
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ERISA provides protection for fiduciaries for participant
investing where plans comply with ERISA section 404(c). ERISA's
protection can be provided either for participants who
affirmatively direct the investment of their accounts or for
participants who do not direct the investment of their accounts
who are invested in a "qualified default investment alternative."98
Plans do not need to comply with ERISA section 404(c) to
allow participants to direct the investment of their accounts.
However, fiduciaries would arguably remain responsible for
participants' investments choices if the plan does not comply with
ERISA section 404(c). 99
A. ProtectionAfforded by ERISA Section 404(c)
For participants who select the investments for their
accounts, the Department has issued a regulation which imposes
additional requirements in order for fiduciaries to receive
protection under ERISA section 404(c)(1).oo
The regulation
conditions relief on a plan offering a broad range of investments
and making certain disclosures to participants.
The regulation includes over twenty conditions, including
providing participants with: (i) certain types of documentation,
information and disclosures; (ii) the ability to give investment
instructions with sufficient frequency given the market volatility
of the investments; and (iii) the ability to choose from a range of
investments that is broad enough to provide participants with the
reasonable opportunity to materially affect the potential returns in
their accounts and to diversify their accounts so as to minimize the
risk of large losses.101 The regulation's conditions include the
disclosure to participants of:
a description of the investment alternatives available under the
plan and, with respect to each designated investment alternative, a
general description of the investment objectives and risk and return

indicated that 387,116 out of 436,207 401(k) plans allowed participants to

direct some or all of their accounts and approximately 62,732,000 out of
65,652,000 participants were able to direct some or all of their accounts.
98.

29 U.S.C § 1104(c).

99. Some practitioners have argued that ERISA section 404(c) is merely a
safe harbor and fiduciaries would not necessary be responsible for
participants' investment decisions if the plan did not comply with ERISA
section 404(c). That said, the Department has taken the position that ERISA
section 404(c) is the only means by which a fiduciary can shift this
responsibility to participants. 57 FR 46906, 46907 (Oct. 13, 1992).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1992).

101. Id.
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characteristics of each such alternative, including information
relating to the type and diversification of assets comprising the
102
portfolio of the designated investment alternative ....
Participants must also be given information about the fees
associated with each investment. The regulation requires that the
disclosure of "a description of any transaction fees and expenses
which affect the participant's or beneficiary's account balance in
connection with purchases or sales of interests in investment
alternatives (e.g., commissions, sales loads, deferred sales charges,
redemption or exchange fees)" and, upon request:
a description of the annual operating expenses of each designated
investment alternative (e. g., investment management fees,
administrative fees, transaction costs) which reduce the rate of
return to participants and beneficiaries, and the aggregate amount
of such expenses expressed as a percentage of average net assets of
the designated investment alternative...,,103 Participants are also
entitled, upon request, to a copy of each investment's prospectus
that is received by the plan, which contains information about the
fees associated with the investment.104
ERISA section
responsibility for
investments offered
regulation to ERISA

404(c)(1) does not relieve fiduciaries of the
prudently selecting and monitoring the
by the plan. The preamble to the final
section 404(c)(1) states:

The Department emphasizes, however, that the act of designating
investment alternatives.., in an ERISA section 404(c) plan is a
fiduciary function to which the limitation on liability provided by
section 404(c) is not applicable. All of the fiduciary provisions of
ERISA remain applicable to both the initial designation of
investment alternatives and investment managers and the ongoing
determination that such alternatives and managers remain suitable
and prudent investment alternatives for the plan. Therefore, the
particular plan fiduciaries responsible for 10 5performing these
functions must do so in accordance with ERISA.
The regulation indicates that relief under this provision of
ERISA only applies where a participant actually directs his
The preamble to the final 404(c)(1) regulation
investments.
explains "until a participant or beneficiary exercises control with
respect to assets contributed on his behalf, plan fiduciaries are
subject to all of the fiduciary duties and obligations set forth in...
10 6
ERISA with respect to such assets."

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
57 Fed. Reg. 46906, 46907 (Oct. 13, 1992).
Id.
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B. Special Rules for Default Investments
ERISA provides that participants who do not direct the
investment of their accounts will be treated as if they had, if the
fiduciaries invest their account in a "qualified default investment
alternative," also known as a "QDIA."107 The Department issued a
final regulation interpreting these provisions. 108 Fiduciaries will
not be liable for any losses related to a qualified default
investment alternative if they prudently select and monitor the
default and otherwise comply with the Department's regulation.
Department Regulation § 2550.404c-5 provides the following
conditions that must be satisfied in order for a fiduciary to obtain
"safe harbor" relief under section 404(c)(5), if the assets are
invested in a "Qualified Default Investment Alternatives" or
"QDIA." Additionally, participants must have been given the
opportunity to provide investment direction but have not done so.
A notice must be given to participants before their first investment
in the QDIA and annually thereafter. Certain materials provided
to the plan for the QDIA must be furnished to participants. (The
regulation cross references portions of the 404(c)(1) regulation
regarding the types of information that needs to be provided to
participants).
Participants must have the opportunity to direct investments
out of the QDIA to another investment no less frequently than
once within any three month period. Transfer restrictions, fees
and expenses cannot be imposed upon a participant who opts out
of investing in the QDIA or who decides to direct his or her own
investments within the first ninety days after the participant's
first deferral is withheld or other first investment in a QDIA. The
plan must offer a "broad range of investment alternatives" as
defined in the 404(c)(1) regulation.
The regulation provides that following types of investments
can be QDIAs: (1) a target-date fund or model, such as a lifecycle
fund, that is selected for a participant based on the participant's
age, target retirement date or life expectancy; (2) a balanced fund
or model, such as a lifestyle fund, which provides for a target level
of risk based on the participants in the plan as a whole; (3) an
investment management service, such as a managed account, that
is based on the participant's age, target retirement date or life
expectancy. The regulation also provides that a money market
account can be used as a QDIA, but only for the first 120 days of
participation. In order to maintain the protection afforded under
404(c)(5), amounts invested in the stable value fund must be rolled
over into one of the other three default options after the 120-day
period. In addition, the regulation provides what the preamble
107. 29 U.S.C § 1104(c)(5).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2007).
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describes as a .'grandfather'-like" provision for amounts defaulted
into stable value funds before the effective date of the regulation
(that is, before December 24, 2007). To receive this protection, the
preamble to the final regulation indicates that fiduciaries must
comply with the regulation for the grandfathered amounts as well.
Deferrals or other contributions made on or after December 24,
2007 must be placed in a QDIA in order to receive protection
under ERISA section 404(c)(5).
The QDIA regulation requires participants to be given notices
that are written in plain language. The regulation provides that
the notice must include: (1) a description of the circumstances
under which a participant's account will be invested in a QDIA; (2)
an explanation of the right of participants to direct the investment
of their accounts; (3) a description of the QDIA, including its
investment objectives, any risk and return characteristics, and
fees and expenses; (4) a description of the right of the participants
to select other investments available under the plan, including a
description of any applicable restrictions, fees or expenses related
to a transfer; and (5) an explanation of where the participants can
obtain investment information about other investments available
under the plan. For automatically enrolled plans, the notice must
also contain an explanation of the circumstances under which
deferrals will be made on behalf of a participant, the percentage of
such contributions, and the right of the participant to opt out or
elect a different percentage.
C. ProposedParticipantDisclosure Regulations
The Department has recently issued proposed regulations
requiring fee disclosures to be made to participants in participantdirected individual account plans. 10 9 The proposed regulations
would require investment information, including fee and expense
information to be provided to participants once the regulations are
finalized.
Fiduciaries would be obligated to make the disclosures
described in the proposed regulation in order to satisfy their
fiduciary obligations. Fiduciaries would continue to be responsible
for prudently selecting and monitoring the plan's investments as
well.
Under the proposed regulation, fiduciaries would be required
to provide participants with information that includes a
description of the fees and expenses charged to participants for
administrative services, designated investment alternatives, and
as a result of actions taken by the participant. 110 Fiduciaries would
also need to provide participants with the actual dollar amount
109.
110.

Prop. Reg. § 2550.404a-5, 73 Fed. Reg. 43013 (Jul. 23, 2008).
Id.
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charged to a participant's account on a quarterly basis for
administrative expenses. Disclosures about the plan's designated
investment alternatives would also be required.
VI. INFORMATION NEEDED BY PARTICIPANTS

Participants need sufficient information about the fees
charged to the plan to make informed decisions. Although they are
not obligated to use a prudent process, to the extent participants
are making decisions about the plan, it would be in their best
interest to do so.' 11 ERISA does not currently explicitly require
the disclosure of fees to participants, except for plans that comply
with ERISA section 404(c)(1). The Department, however, has
proposed regulations that would require disclosures. The 9th
Annual Transamerica Retirement Survey indicated that only
twenty-six percent of participants surveyed were aware that any
fees were charged to their account.1 12 Only twenty-one percent of
the participants that were aware of the fees were "very familiar"
with the fees charged. 11 3
However, the information needed by participants differs from
that of fiduciaries. Additionally, a study by Julie Agnew and Lisa
R. Szykman of the Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College has shown that participants are subject to information
overload. 114 Agnew and Szykman have found that "[research in
the decision-making literature suggests that rather than
processing more information when decisions become more
complex, consumers tend to reduce the amount of effort they
115
expend in order to make their decision or choice."
Additionally, many participants do not have significant
experience with investments and therefore may be less likely to be
able to understand complex investment information. The 9th
Annual Transamerica Retirement Survey indicated that seventy
one percent of participants surveyed agreed with the statement
that they did not know as much as they should about retirement
investing.1 6 Another example is the research conducted by the
Pension Research Council of the University of Pennsylvania
Wharton School, which indicates that many participants in 401(k)

111. ERISA section 404(c) provides that participants who direct the
investment of their accounts are not fiduciaries. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c).
112. 9th Annual TransamericaRetirement Survey, (Feb. 28, 2008), available
at http://www.transamerica center.org.
113. Id.
114. Julie Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and Information
Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice and Investor
Experience 3 (Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working Paper No. 2004-15, 2004),
available at http://www.bc.edu/ centers/crr/papers/wp_2004-15.pdf.
115. Id.
116. 9th Annual TransamericaRetirement Survey, supra note 112.
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plans are not properly investing their accounts. The research uses
a stop light color approach to characterize the conformance of
401(k) participant's portfolios to the paper's rules of portfolio
construction. 117 The paper estimates that:
[N]early 43% [of participants] construct "green" portfolios with
balanced exposure to diversified equities, while another 26%
construct "yellow" portfolios with possibly too-aggressive or tooconservative equity holdings. Another three in ten participants
make egregious errors and have "red" portfolios-either holding zero
in equities or over concentrating their account in employer stock. 118
A. Information Needed by Participants
Employees who are eligible to participate in 401(k) plans are
typically responsible for deciding whether to participate in the
plan, how much to contribute and how to invest their accounts. In
order to evaluate whether to participate in the plan and how much
to contribute, employees need to understand the direct cost of
participation so they can compare the benefits of participating in
the plan with saving outside of the plan. These types of fees would
only include amounts that reduce the value of their accounts,
either directly or by reducing their investment returns.
Participants also need to understand the investment expenses
for the options available in the plan. In order to compare the
investment choices and decide which investments are appropriate
for their accounts, participants need to be able to understand how
much they are paying or would pay for each investment offered by
the plan. Participants will need other types of information about
the investments, such as historical rates of return, in order to
make assessments about the plan's options.
B. Recommended Disclosuresto Participants
Participants should be given the minimum amount of
information necessary to enable them to make decisions about
their involvement in the plan and investment decisions. That is,
participants, regardless of whether they are in a plan that intends
to comply with ERISA section 404(c), need to be given information
about any fees that reduce the value of their accounts, either
directly or by reducing their investment returns. For investments,
participants need basic information about the investment's risk
and return objectives, historical rates of return and investment
fees so they can compare them to other options offered by the plan.

117. Gary R. Mottola and Stephen P. Utkus, Red, Yellow, and Green: A
Taxonomy of 401(k) Portfolio Choices, PRC WP2007-14, Pension Research
Council Working Paper (June 2007), available at http://www.reish.com/
publications/pdfredyellowgreen.pdf.
118. Id.
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The proposed regulation issued by the Department is designed to
accomplish these objectives.
However, it is important that the information given to
participants is written in plain English and uniform, to the extent
possible. Additionally, any additional information that the
fiduciaries or the Department believes should be given to
participants should only be provided upon request.
VII.

CONCLUSION

With the increased popularity of 401(k) plans, more
participants are relying on them in order to help them objectives of
obtaining adequate retirement savings. Sufficient information
needs to be given to the persons responsible for making decisions
about their plans, that is, fiduciaries and participants. However,
the roles of fiduciaries and participants differ. As a result, the
information given to them should be reflective of their varying
responsibilities, but responsive to their respective needs.

